Recent revelations that two of the al-Shabaab social media accounts that were shut down last year have been resuscitated poses a major challenge to the government in its war against terror.
It has emerged that some of the 500 social media accounts that the government blocked last November are operating normally. Also operating is the al-Shabab radio affiliate, Al-Furqaan, which operates in areas controlled by the militants, but which was also shut down in November.
On assuming power in May 2022, the government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud embarked on a three-pronged attack that included military, degrading al-Shahab financial avenues and countering the militant’s ideology.
However, the government later realised that al-Shabaab’s communication network through social media outlets such as WhatsApp, Telegram, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and TikTok were more lethal and effective than their guns and bombs.
A year earlier in October 2022, the government warned mainstream media not to report on al-Shabaab attacks, or face closure. At least 10 news websites, one television station, and 40 social media accounts were banned from covering al-Shabaab for “dissemination of extremism ideology”.
Deputy Information Minister Abdirahman Yusuf al-Adala termed all Al Shabaab related propaganda coverage including their terrorist acts and their ideology as “punishable crimes”. More than 40 accounts on Facebook and Twitter were suspended.
While the government believes that censoring al Shabaab media coverage will tame terrorism, it has sometimes boomeranged on the government in many ways. First, the government by forcing the media to ignore al-shabaab exposes journalists to attacks by the militants on the basis of being biased. Al-Shabaab had warned that one-sided media houses will be considered as part of the “enemy”.
There is also the challenge that the government is yet to develop high level technological network to identify which media house is supporting al-Shabaab or not. Some media houses which were banned came out to complain that they were genuinely offering information to the public—regardless of whom it offends.
Omar Osman, the secretary general of the National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ), complained that the Journalists were between a rock and a hard place, in that they are facing attacks from both al-Shabaab and the government. They are regularly and personally trolled, harassed and physically attacked them for writing in their Facebook pages or accounts.
Secondly, it would be foolhardy for the Somalia journalist to ignore al-Shabaab activities while media houses in the other countries in the region such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda continue to cover the effects of al-Shabaab terrorism activities in their countries and beyond.
Al-Shabaab has a strong technical team that distributes materials locally and abroad and is using social media as the major source of new recruitments. This team has the technical knowledge on how to generate fake mobile numbers and social media accounts.
New accounts are generated within hours of old accounts being banned. They also operate parallel networks on Facebook, Telegram, TikTok, and X (formerly Twitter). al-Shabaab networks circulated detailed instructions for accessing Telegram through virtual private networks (VPNs) and custom proxy servers.
The group is able to sustain a certain degree of influence through the combination of a well-established brand and continuous marketing initiatives, given that it is fully aware of the impact of repeated, consistent messages.
The communication network operates at various sophisticated levels. Those who produce video, audio and written contents and distribute affiliate outlets; radio stations and online sites that masquerade as legitimate news outlets, and which immediately pick up the content and broadcast or print, and a group of “boosters” who their audience to any new pasting.
As a result, al-Shabaab’s war is no longer limited to its ground operations; in addition to carrying out physical assaults, the group is also working to expand its online frontline by investing in the resources necessary to combine its military might with its ability to operate in concert.
Its pet subject is to portray any sitting government as an agent of the “colonisers”, while portraying themselves as nationalists who are not only keen on protecting the country’s sovereignty but as a guardian of the Islamic faith.
For instance, the ongoing Gaza War has given al-Shabaab the opportunity to draw parallelism between itself and the oppressed Palestinians. They are equating their activities with the anti-colonial struggles by Hamas.
But the government is not sleeping as it tries to catch up with al-Shabaab techniques and social media capacities by employing or training technically-savvy youth to counter the militant’s propaganda.
There is a dedicated team at the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) that monitors and intercepts damaging and extremist content. This is because the government has realised that reactive approaches that it has been using are proving ineffective with ever changing technology.
The government and its technical team are now developing a proactive approach. This is after acknowledging that al-Shabaab’s al-Shabaab’s social media presence and technical proficiency, and are equally applying emerging technology proactively.
